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Abstract: Pulvermüller restricts himself to an unnecessarily narrow range
of evidence to support his claims. Evidence from neural modeling and be-
havioral experiments provides further support for an account of words en-
coded as transcortical cell assemblies. A cognitive neuroscience of lan-
guage must include a range of methodologies (e.g., neural, computational,
and behavioral) and will need to focus on the on-line processes of real-time
language processing in more natural contexts.
Understanding the interaction between the perceptual modalities
and the cortices that subserve them is a goal that has too long
played second fiddle to the more popular goal of “finding the
boxes in the head.” Although many perceptual/cognitive functions
exhibit some degree of cortical localization, the continuous com-
munication between these “modules” is at least as important as
their anatomical separation. Indeed, if Pulvermüller is right about
the Hebbian transcortical cell assembly being the brain’s primary
“unit of representation,” then a solitary punctate region of cortex
whose averaged activity correlates with a broadly defined class of
perceptual/cognitive tasks may not be especially relevant for un-
derstanding perception and cognition. Instead, what we should
study are more specific environmental instances (ecologically
valid combinations of stimuli) and sequences thereof, and the mul-
tiple cortical regions that participate in representing those envi-
ronmental instances.
Pulvermüller’s shortcoming is that he unnecessarily limits his
evidence predominantly to one methodology (neuroimaging),
when a wide range of methodologies provide insight into “words
in the brain’s language.” This commentary points to the relevance
of two areas of cognitive neuroscience that Pulvermüller barely
mentions: neural modeling and behavioral experiments. By also
looking at computational and behavioral results, one can see a
more complete picture of how a proposal like Pulvermüller’s may
be manifested at multiple levels of description: from the individ-
ual synaptic weights that produce the cell assemblies to the motor
output that is produced by the cell assemblies.
Neural networks. If Pulvermüller’s proposal is correct, it indi-
cates that one’s representation of a word includes multi-modal in-
formation not traditionally considered linguistic (e.g., perceptual
features, motor routines). He suggests that our mental represen-
tation of a word might best be described as a pattern of activation
widely distributed across a disparate set of information processing
units. In the field of neural networks, this notion of a “distributed
representation” has made significant advances since Hebb’s orig-
inal thesis (far more than is implied by Pulvermüller’s brief nod to
the neural network literature; Gutfreund & Toulouse 1994).
As far as they go, the neuroimaging results are substantial. How-
ever, the descriptions of the physiology of these cell assemblies,
the spread of neural activation throughout them, and their tem-
poral dynamics, are left somewhat vague and impressionistic. This
is, of course, less a criticism of Pulvermüller’s review than a re-
flection on the lack of precision of current neuroimaging tech-
niques. These limitations will undoubtedly be somewhat reme-
died with improved technology. For now, though, further insight
into these more specific issues can come from the study of bio-
logically plausible artificial neural networks. Far more in-depth
analysis and experimentation can be performed on artificial neural
networks than will ever be possible with real brains.
Of particular interest are attractor networks, which represent
words as distributed representations and have some temporal dy-
namics leading to the full ignition of a cell assembly (McRae et al.
1997). Moreover, models that can integrate sensory information
from separate modalities during learning (de Sa & Ballard 1997)
can provide examples of possible developmental trajectories for
Hebb-inspired accounts of lexical acquisition.
Behavioral experiments. As important as it is to “zoom in” on
the subcomponents of the cell assembly, we also need to see the
“wide angle” view that includes what neural representations are
good for: behavior. Of course, some behaviors are better than oth-
ers at elucidating the temporal dynamics of a cell assembly at-
tempting full ignition. For example, Munakata et al. (1997) use a
developing distributed representation to explain how some infants
who are still making the classic A-not-B error in their reachingbe-
havior actually show signs of being aware of the correct solution
in their eye movement behavior. Behaviors, such as eye move-
ments, that are sensitive to probabilistic information can provide
converging evidence on the partially activated representations
(cell assemblies) that are computed in real time while the brain
gravitates toward a stable state to encode an environmental in-
stance.
As another example, when adult participants are instructed to
“pick up the candy,” they never reach for incorrect objects, but
they often look at incorrect objects whose names have similar
phonology such as a candle (Tanenhaus & Spivey-Knowlton 1996).
Additionally, as Hebb himself predicted, oculomotor representa-
tions are activated when participants are imagining an event or re-
membering an object. While listening to a story about a train going
past, participants made predominantly horizontal eye movements;
and when asked to recall a missing object on a grid, there were eye
movements toward the vacated square (Spivey & Geng 1998).
Summary. To study anything in “the brain’s language,” we must
be as opportunistic with our information sources as the brain is
with its.We need convergence of methodologies. We need to map
out in detail the cycle from perception to action. In contrast to
neuroimaging, neural modeling simultaneously allows the spatial
and temporal resolution necessary to explore how a particular cell
assembly might approach its stable state over dozens of timesteps
(Tabor et al. 1997). Moreover, behavioral experiments allow us to
observe the pragmatic consequences of these cell assemblies,
realized as motor output grounded in the same environment as the
original perceptual input, thus completing the cycle.
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